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The Materiality Test-Mills Revisited
I. INTRODUCTION
Hapless attorneys, accountants and other individuals whose ef-
forts have been subjected to the 20/20 hindsight (or so it must seem
to them) of federal courts through the mandates of section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' and associated rule 14a-91 deal-
ing with proxies, can often agree with the words of John Greenleaf
Whittier, who wrote, "Of all sad words of tongue or pen, [t]he
saddest are these: it might have been." 3 Tennyson, too, was aware
of the futility implicit in the phrase when he wrote, "The world
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities ex-
change or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent
or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered
pursuant to section 781 of this title.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1975) reads as follows:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral,
containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances
under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or
which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier
communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or
subject matter which has become false or misleading.
(b) The fact that a proxy statement, form of proxy or other soliciting material has
been filed with or examined by the Commission shall not be deemed a finding by the
Commission that such material is accurate or complete or not false or misleading, or
that the Commission has passed upon the merits of or approved any statement con-
tained therein or any matter to be acted upon by security holders. No representation
contrary to the foregoing shall be made.
NorE: The following are some examples of what, depending upon particular facts
and circumstances, may be misleading within the meaning of this section:
(a) Predictions as to specific future market values, earnings, or dividends.
(b) Material which directly or indirectly impugns character, integrity or personal
reputation, or directly or indirectly makes charges concerning improper, illegal or
immoral conduct or associations, without factual foundation.
(c) Failure to so identify a proxy statement, form of proxy and other soliciting
material as to clearly distinguish it from the soliciting material of any other person or
persons soliciting for the same meeting or subject matter.
(d) Claims made prior to a meeting regarding the results of a solicitation.
3. J.G.-Whittier, Maud Muller (1854).
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which credits what is done [i]s cold to all that might have been.",
"Might have been" has become a significant pitfall for those
charged with producing proxies which meet the requirements of
section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and its associated rules since the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co.5 Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, deliv-
ered-perhaps unwittingly-the critical phrase when discussing the
interpretation of "material" ' as contained in rule 14a-9. He wrote
that where an omission or misstatement in a proxy statement had
been found to be material, as in Mills, such determination automat-
ically resulted in a conclusion that the defect might have been con-
sidered important by a reasonable shareowner who was attempting
to decide how to vote on the issue for which his proxy was being
solicited.7 Justice Harlan went on to say in the next sentence that
the requirement is that the defect have a significant propensity to
affect the voting process in order to meet the terms of rule 14a-9.8
In Northway, Inc. v. TSC Industries, Inc.,' a federal court was
again called upon to determine the materiality of particular facts
omitted from a proxy statement. The requirements of Mills were
found to be somewhat ambiguous in the sense that an omitted fact
could more readily be considered material if it were necessary only
to find that a single reasonable shareowner might have considered
it important rather than to find that it had a significant propensity
4. A. Tennyson, In Memoriam LXXV (1850).
5. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1128 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines "material" as, "Important;
more or less necessary; having influence or effect; going to the merits; having to do with
matter, as distinguished from form."
7. Justice Harlan stated:
Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has been shown to be
"material," as it was found to be here, that determination itself indubitably embodies
a conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it might have been considered
important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to vote.
396 U.S. at 384.
8. Justice Harlan stated:
This requirement that the defect have a significant propensity to affect the voting
process is found in the express terms of Rule 14a.9, and it adequately serves the
purpose of ensuring that a cause of action cannot be established by proof of a defect
so trivial, or so unrelated to the transaction for which approval is sought, that correc-
tion of the defect or imposition of liability would not further the interests protected
by § 14(a).
Id.
9. 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975).
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to affect the entire voting process.'" The court in Northway opted
for the broader interpretation of materiality by adopting a test that
includes all facts which a single reasonable stockholder might con-
sider important."
Because of the questions raised in the Northway case as to the
proper test of materiality, the Supreme Court on October 6, 1975
granted certiorari to consider whether "materiality" under the pro-
hibition against materially false and misleading statements or
omissions requires only a showing of relevance to "some few
shareholders," as indicated in Northway, or whether the "signifi-
cant propensity" language of Mills is controlling. 12 In order to under-
stand the basis on which the Court could decide the materiality
issue, the case law leading up to Mills and the response of the
various courts to the definition of materiality enunciated in Mills
will be examined.
II. PROXY RULE VIOLATIONS PRIOR TO Mills
The private right of action for violation of section 14(a) of the
Securities Act was first recognized by the Supreme Court in J. .
Case Co. v. Borak,3 where the Court considered the question
whether, under section 27 of the Act," a federal cause of action was
created for rescission or damages to a stockholder with respect to a
completed merger authorized through the use of proxy solicitations
containing false or misleading information. 5 The Court recognized
that Congress made no reference to a private right of action under
section 14(a)"' but found in the Act's legislative history the intent
to "'control the conditions under which proxies may be solicited
with a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses which . . .
[had] frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of stockhold-
ers.' "' It found this intent expressed in section 14(a) by the lan-
guage "[als necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors."'" The Court did more than merely au-
10. Id. at 330.
11. Id.
12. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 423 U.S. 820 (1975).
13. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
15. 377 U.S. at 428.
16. Id. at 431.
17. Id., quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
18. 377 U.S. at 432 (emphasis omitted).
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thorize a private right of action for alleged proxy violations by refus-
ing to limit the remedies in such actions to prospective relief.'" The
explicit establishment of a private right of action for alleged viola-
tions and the Court's refusal to so limit the remedies thus foresha-
dowed Mills. 20
III. THE Mills CASE
The plaintiffs in Mills had been shareowners of the Electric Auto-
Lite Company until 1963 when it merged into Merganthaler Lino-
type Company. They had unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the merg-
ing companies and a third company, American Manufacturing
Company, Inc., from voting proxies obtained through an allegedly
misleading proxy statement. An amended complaint was later filed,
seeking, inter alia, to have the merger set aside. The essence of the
complaint was that the proxy solicitation to Auto-Lite shareholders
failed to disclose that Merganthaler controlled over 50% of the out-
standing Auto-Lite shares and that American, in turn owned 33%
of Merganthaler; and while the proxy disclosed that all eleven of
Auto-Lite's directors favored the merger, it failed to mention that
the eleven were all nominees of Merganthaler. The complaint was
asserted both derivatively and on behalf of the class of all Auto-Lite
minority shareholders.
The district court found as a matter of law that the omission from
the proxy statement was material and ordered a hearing to deter-
mine whether there was a causal connection between the section
14(a) violation and plaintiffs' alleged injuries.2 ' From the evidence
presented at the hearing, the court found the existence of the causal
relationship, granted an interlocutory judgment and referred the
case to a master to determine appropriate relief.22 The Court of
19. Id. at 434.
20. For development of the private right to relief from damages resulting from misleading
proxy statements during the period between J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), and
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) see Weiss v. Sunasco, Inc., 295 F. Supp.
824 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Globus, Inc.
v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Robbins v. Banner Indus., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Laurenzano v.
Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F.
Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 916-24 (2d ed. 1961).
21. 396 U.S. at 378-79.
22. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826, 830-31 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed as to the material deficiency
of the proxy statement but reversed as to causation." The court of
appeals, while acknowledging the futility of inquiring into the
"[r]eliance by thousands of individuals,"24 nevertheless required a
test corresponding to the common law fraud test of reliance on the
misrepresentation. 5 Because of this, defendants were required only
to prove that the merger had merit and was fair to minority share-
holders in order for the trial court to conclude that the merger would
have been approved even in the absence of any misleading state-
ments in the proxy." At this point the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to consider the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the proxy
rules.27
Stressing from the outset that the question of materiality was not
under review by the Supreme Court,28 Justice Harlan left no doubt
of the Court's disapproval of the Seventh Circuit's causation test by
noting that substitution of the merits of a merger for informed stock-
holders' votes would preclude certain proxy violations from private
redress as provided in section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and articulated
in Borak. 9 Since, however, the questions of fact relating to the
causation issue were not under review in Borak, and because similar
facts were in fact under review in Mills, Justice Harlan undertook
to define the elements of the cause of action and thus forged the
language which has since that time caused significant confusion
among the courts attempting to follow its dictates."
Even though he had noted that the issue of materiality was not
under review, Justice Harlan interwove a definition of materiality
inextricably into his test for causation. This test embodied three
elements: a shareowner; an issue on which the shareowner's vote is
solicited; and a proxy statement containing material omissions or
misstatements which may be expected to influence the shareowner's
vote. Justice Harlan stated that a finding of materiality embodies
a conclusion that the defect might have been considered important
by a reasonable shareowner in deciding how to vote. Although this
23. Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1968).
24. Id. at 436 n.10.
25. Id. at 436.
26. Id.
27. Mills v. Electric Autolite Co. 394 U.S. 971 (1969).
28. 396 U.S. at 381 n.4.
29. Id. at 381-82.
30. Id. at 384. See note 7 supra.
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has been interpreted by some commentators to mean that a finding
that a reasonable shareowner might have considered an omission to
be important would not be conclusive of materiality,' it is difficult
to read this language otherwise. If a reasonable shareowner would
have found omitted language important it was material; if it was
material a reasonable shareowner would have found it important.
Further, the materiality of the defect is essential in the link between
the shareowner and his vote in order to find causation. Even if the
materiality of a specific claimed defect was not under review in
Mills, an understanding of materiality was essential to the develop-
ment of a test for causation. Certainly a better definition of materi-
ality under rule 14a-9 has not been articulated elsewhere. It is not
surprising that later courts faced with the issue of materiality have
looked to this language and adopted it with regularity as their own
test.
However, Justice Harlan continued and further required that the
defect have a significant propensity to affect the voting process.32
This inevitably raises questions of the apparent dichotomy of an
omission considered important by a single reasonable shareowner
deciding how to vote on the one hand, and an omission having a
significant propensity to affect the entire voting process on the other
hand. Did the "significant propensity" requirement apply to an
individual shareowner's voting, or to the voting process as a whole?33
Justice Harlan went on to conclude that causation was sufficiently
proved upon the finding of a material defect or omission in a proxy
solicitation which was an essential link in the transaction.3 4
IV. CONSIDERATION OF THE MATERIALITY ISSUE SINCE Mills
Although Justice Harlan may not have intended to formulate a
materiality test in his Mills opinion, courts have since consistently
relied on his language as a standard for the evaluation of allegedly
31. See, e.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1354 (3d ed. 1972).
32. 396 U.S. at 384.
33. One way of resolving the apparent paradox of these two adjacent sentences in Harlan's
opinion would be to consider the reasonable shareowner as typical of the entire body of
shareowners (although there is no need to assume that all shareowners in any particular
corporate universe are reasonable). Thus, an omission which might have been considered
important by a large segment of the shareowners in deciding how to vote might be an omission
considered important by a "reasonable shareowner." The omission would therefore have a
significant propensity to affect the entire voting process.
34. 396 U.S. at 384.
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false and misleading or omitted material in proxies. At least four
circuit courts of appeals (in addition to the Seventh Circuit in
Northway) have formulated a materiality test based on Mills or
formed their own test after deciding that Mills was not controlling.
In the Third Circuit, courts have confronted the question fre-
quently since 1970. In Robinson v. Penn Central Co. 5 the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania cited the
Mills language and included the "significant propensity" portion.
The opinion distinguished the sophisticated analyst, who may be
able to glean material facts from proxy statements which would not
be apparent to the reasonable stockholder .3 The standard against
which the statements must be measured was that of the "reasonable
shareowner. ' 37
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc.31 applied the Mills standard of "might have been
considered important by the reasonable shareholder who was in the
process of deciding how to vote" to test materiality in a section
10(b)3" action, finding the standard equally applicable in 14a-9 and
10b-5 actions. Thus the Third Circuit appeared to have adopted the
broader "might have been" standard as its test of materiality in
both 10b-5 and 14a-9 situations. In his dissenting opinion, 9 Judge
Adams noted the almost identical nature of the Mills materiality
test (for a section 14(a) action) and that enunciated in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.4 (for a section 10(b) action). Both tests are to the
35. 336 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
36. Id. at 657.
37. Id.
38. 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
39. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in connection with
the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a national securities exchange, in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
40. 458 F.2d at 270 (Adams, J., dissenting).
41. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005, rehearing denied, 404 U.S.
1064 (1971).
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effect that the question is whether a reasonable man would attach
importance to the misrepresented fact in determining his choice of
action. The two tests were used jointly by Judge Adams in his dis-
cussion. While the majority and the dissent disagreed on the materi-
ality of particular facts, they were using the same test.
A later district court case in the Third Circuit, Puma v.
Marriott,"2 adopted the Kohn test while citing Mills, rather than
Kohn, for the appropriate language. The court43 again recognized
the identical nature of the legal standards for materiality under
sections 10(b) and 14(a), and decided to make factual determina-
tions and evaluations of the materiality issue simultaneously for
both sections.
But the Third Circuit has not been unanimous in falling into line
behind Kohn. In three subsequent decisions44 district courts in the
Third Circuit all included the "significant propensity" language of
Mills as part of their materiality test, thus appearing to adopt a
stricter interpretation than that of Kohn. Subsequently, in Rochez
Bros. v. Rhoades,5 a section 10(b) action, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals stated that the test is whether a reasonable man would
attach importance to the misrepresentations or omissions in deter-
mining his choice of action, citing List v. Fashion Park, Inc.4" but
mentioning neither Mills nor Kohn. The test appears nearly identi-
cal to the Mills-based test of Kohn, but the Third Circuit now
appears to be in a state of confusion over its materiality test for
actions under sections 10(b) or 14(a). For example, in Mayer v.
Development Corporation of America, 7 the District Court for the
District of Delaware compared the Mills-based "might have been"
test and found it less strict than the "would have been" test stated
in Rochez. The court then opted for the stricter test.
Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit in Gerstle v.
42. 348 F. Supp. 18 (D. Del. 1972) (denying motion for summary judgment); 363 F. Supp.
750 (D. Del. 1973) (finding that any misstatements or omissions in proxy statement were not
significant, or too remotely related to the acquisition to have been material violations of the
security laws).
43. Puma v. Marriott, 363 F. Supp. 750 (D. Del. 1973).
44. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del.
1973); Lyman v. Standard Brands, Inc., CCH SEC. REP. 94,153 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Allen v.
Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
45. 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974).
46. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 933
(1965).
47. 396 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1975).
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Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,4" was among the first to do more than liter-
ally apply the Mills test for materiality. He recognized that the
Harlan language is often regarded as a clear definition of materiality
for the purpose of rule 14a-9 actions but pointed out that the lan-
guage was not intended as such since the issue of materiality was
not before the court. He characterized Harlan's "might have been"
language as a minimum standard for supporting his holding that
such showing of materiality was sufficient evidence of causation.
Judge Friendly further noted Harlan's citation of Judge Waterman's
opinion in List v. Fashion Park, Inc." (that the basic test of materi-
ality is whether a reasonable man would attach importance to the
omitted fact in determining his choice of action) 0 and his own mate-
riality test in General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc.51 Both,
in Judge Friendly's view, set a somewhat stricter standard of mate-
riality than Justice Harlan's language. He found the "significant
propensity" language of Harlan to be more appropriate as a test,
concluding that a standard tending toward probability rather than
mere possibility was preferred where significant damages hung in
the balance. Because he believed that materiality was not at issue
in Mills and the test formulated therein not controlling, Judge
Friendly adhered to his own test as formulated in General Time.5
Two other circuit courts of appeals have relied on Judge
Friendly's test enunciated in General Time. In the Ninth Circuit,
Jansky v. Miller53 presented a situation in which the proxy solicita-
tion mentioned the intention of the plaintiff to present two propos-
als at the annual meeting, but details of the nature of the proposals
were omitted. The court found that the omission of these details did
not have, in the language of Mills, "a significant propensity to affect
the voting process." 4 The court here used the General Time test to
supplement Mills, i.e., that the test of materiality is whether there
is a substantial likelihood that the omission might have led a stock-
48. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
49. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1965).
51. 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
52. Other decisions of the Second Circuit have adopted substantially the same test. See,
e.g., Laurenzano v. Einbender, 448 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1971); Lewis v. Dansker, 357 F. Supp. 636
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp, 357 F. Supp. 1010
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
53. 474 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1973).
54. Id. at 367.
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holder to grant a proxy contrary to what he would have done in the
absence of the omission. The Fifth Circuit, in Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co.," responded to plaintiff's appeal of the trial court's
definition of materiality contained in its charge to the jury. The trial
court had used the Restatement of Torts based test of "whether a
reasonably prudent person would attach importance to the informa-
tion in determining his course of action.""6 Plaintiff wanted the
court to use Mills type language by substituting, in effect, the word
"might" for the word "would." Judge Wisdom noted the Fifth Cir-
cuit's recent adoption in John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman57 of a test
similar to that used by the trial court.58 In considering the language
of the Mills test, Judge Wisdom took note of Judge Friendly's rather
thorough examination of the Harlan opinion in Gamble-Skogmo
and embraced it as the opinion of the Fifth Circuit.5"
Thus the Second, Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have all
adopted a stricter test of materiality than would be inferred from
the Mills language. The Seventh Circuit stands alone with the broad
test formulated in Northway. While the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit has not been confronted with the materiality issue,
two district court decisions in that circuit took an approach similar
to that of the Seventh Circuit."
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court spoke again on the issue of mate-
riality under the Act of 1934 in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States." The context in this case was that of an alleged section 10(b)
violation and the Court stated that the test for materiality requires
only that "a reasonable investor might have considered [the facts]
important in the making of this decision." 2 Mills was cited by the
Court in support of this language in spite of its application to section
14(a).63 Two conclusions can arise from the citation to Mills in
Affiliated Ute: (1) that the court considers materiality for purposes
of sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the 1934 Act to be identical and, (2)
55. 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1975).
56. 489 F.2d at 603.
57. 446 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1971).
58. Id. at 804.
59. 489 F.2d at 604.
60. Ross v. Longchamps, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Beatty v. Bright, 318
F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
61. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
62. Id. at 153-54.
63. Id. at 154.
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whether or not Justice Harlan intended his language to be a formal
test for materiality, there can now be little doubt that it has been
established as such. It should also be noted that there is no specific
citation in Affiliated Ute to the "significant propensity" language
of Mills. In fact, inclusion of the "significant propensity" language
as a part of the Mills test, referring as it does to the entire voting
process in a proxy contest, would tend to make the Mills test incom-
patible with the test for materiality under section 10(b) which in-
volved activities by individuals. This may be an indication that the
Supreme Court did not consider the "significant propensity" lan-
guage to be a limitation on the materiality test stated in Mills.
V. THE Northway CASE
The Northway case presented a factual situation similar in many
ways to Mills. Defendants, TSC Industries and National Industries,
issued a joint proxy statement to TSC shareowners, of which plain-
tiff Northway was one, requesting approval of liquidation and sale
of all TSC assets to Northway. Although sufficient proxies were
received to effect approval of the merger and the transaction was in
fact completed, the proxy statement failed to disclose a change in
the control of TSC Industries resulting from a sale of their interests
by the controlling shareowners, the Schmidts, to National Indus-
tries. This information was required by rule 14a-3 and schedule 14A.
The district court 4 and the Seventh Circuit agreed that the issue
of control was a factual issue for which the district court properly
denied summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed
the district court's denial of summary judgment for Northway on its
rule 14a-9 claim that the proxy statement failed to include a mate-
rial fact. 5 The Seventh Circuit ruled that Northway, in order to
prevail, had to establish facts showing that an omitted item was
material as a matter of law. It was suggested that to establish mate-
riality as a matter of law, a demonstration that reasonable minds
could not differ on the materiality question was required.6 The
question of the proper test to apply in determining the materiality
of an omitted fact was then considered. The apparent dichotomy of
"might have been considered important by a reasonable share-
64. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 361 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
65. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 327 (1975).
66. Id. at 329.
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owner" as against "a significant propensity to affect the voting
process" was examined, with the conclusion that the first test would
classify more omissions as material, thus better serving the intended
purpose of the disclosure provisions. Judge Swygert then went on to
examine the specific facts omitted from the TSC proxy statement
in light of the stated test and found that the district court's denial
of summary judgment as to the liability of defendants was im-
proper. 7
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is now faced with the task of clarifying the
test for materiality under section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 as formulated
in Mills and as divergently interpreted in Northway and Gamble-
Skogmo. The late Justice Harlan can shed no light on what he really
meant to say in Mills and the Court's makeup has undergone a
significant change since Mills was decided. The door would appear
to be open to the formulation of an entirely new, more clearly articu-
lated test, since in Harlan's own words, the question of materiality
was not at issue in Mills.
The Supreme Court will find the history of the materiality test
for section 14(a) to be entirely consistent, if not helpful in defining
the test itself. Without exception, courts faced with the question
since Mills have looked to its language in formulating their own
tests. Because of its susceptibility to varying interpretations, how-
ever, the result of the courts' reliance has been the development of
at least two divergent approaches, of which Northway and Gamble-
Skogmo are leading examples.
The Northway court interpreted the Mills language as susceptible
of two different results depending on whether the "might have
been" or the "significant propensity" portions are selected. Since it
cannot reasonably be supposed that Harlan intended to articulate
two different standards-he may in fact not have intended to articu-
late any-it would seem that the Northway court, and other courts
67. Id. at 342.
Since the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Northway, another court has already recog-
nized the conflict between the test articulated therein and the materiality test followed in
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973), both of which were derived
from the same paragraph in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). In Ash v.
Baker, 392 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Pa. 1975), the court did not choose between the two ap-
proaches, however, because on the facts no materiality under either test was found.
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faced with the same problem, should have made an effort to devise
a test which could reasonably be interpreted as consistent with both
segments of the Harlan language. As suggested above, this task is
made somewhat easier by constructing a hypothetical universe of
shareowners, all or most of whom qualify as Harlan's "reasonable
shareholder." Such an assumption would make possible the conclu-
sion that what a single reasonable shareholder finds material could
affect the voting process as a whole. In order to complete this test
it is necessary to reconcile the possible differences created by the
words "might" and "significant." "Might" implies a fairly low
probability of actuality; but what level of probability must be asso-
ciated with "might" before it reaches the level of "significant"? The
word "might" is probably the largest stumbling block in the Harlan
language. Perhaps the word was not used to imply a low probability
of actuality but to convey a sense of unsureness-one does not know
if a misrepresentation was material, but it arguably "might have
been." Even if only ten percent of our universe of reasonable
shareowners actually would have found materiality, this would be
"significant" where a very small shift in votes would have changed
the result. However, according to Mills, only the existence of the
materiality and not a change in result need be proved. If, therefore,
a reasonable shareowner, one of a finite group of reasonable share-
owners, might have found an omission or misrepresentation to be
material, there is a strong likelihood that it would have a significant
propensity to affect the voting process and thus there is no incon-
sistency in the two apparently contradictory sentences.
How would such an interpretation of the Mills test have affected
Northway and Gamble-Skogmo? Judge Swygert in Northway
wanted a test that would include all facts which a reasonable stock-
holder might consider important." The suggested interpretation of
Mills does exactly that. Judge Friendly in Gamble-Skogmo thought
the use of the word "might" implied too low a probability, or rather
possibility, to use such a test as a basis for imposing large damages.9
Yet had the word "might" been viewed in a context of an entire
universe of shareowners, Judge Friendly may have had less diffi-
culty in recognizing a probability that a material omission would
"have a significant propensity to affect the voting process." Both
68. 512 F.2d at 330.
69. 478 F.2d at 1302.
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judges could have reached what was for them a satisfactory result
without the necessity to dissect the Mills language again and again.
One barometer of the Supreme Court's approach to the question
presented in Northway is its decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores,711 a case in which the class of plaintiffs who may main-
tain a private cause of action for damages under rule 10b-5 was at
issue. A rule enunciated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.7
stated that only a person who is either a purchaser or a seller of
securities may bring an action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
or rule 10b-5. Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Birnbaum,72 the Second Circuit's examination of the issues raised
therein had been the most authoritative statement prior to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Blue Chip Stamps. Meanwhile, the
Birnbaum doctrine had generated extensive academic comment, 73
often critical, and later judicial opinions from the Second Circuit"
had created enough exceptions to the doctrine to have nearly emas-
culated it by the time the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision
in Blue Chip Stamps.7"
The Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip Stamps has vindi-
cated the Birnbaum doctrine and given it new vitality, thus spawn-
ing in all likelihood a new generation of criticism from commenta-
tors who disliked the Birnbaum decision itself. The Court's decision
in Blue Chip Stamps can be characterized as a move toward a
stricter interpretation of the 1934 Act. Where Birnbaum had se-
verely restricted the parties with standing to maintain a private
cause of action under rule 10b-5, subsequent decisions (prior to Blue
Chip Stamps) had tended to give a more prophylactic effect to the
Act by allowing numerous exceptions. Blue Chip Stamps reinstated
the narrow qualifications for standing to sue under rule 10b-5. Dis-
senters in Blue Chip Stamps included Justices Blackmun, Douglas
and Brennan, who argued for a broad interpretation of such regula-
tory statutes so as to protect as many parties as possible."
70. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
71. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
72. See note 71 supra.
73. See, e.g., Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725, 833 (1956);
Note, Civil Liability under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 VA. L. REV. 537, 570 (1956).
74. See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); Syming-
ton Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1967); A.T. Brod & Co. v.
Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
75. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973).
76. 421 U.S. at 761 (Blackmun, Douglas, Brennan, JJ., dissenting.)
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The decision in Blue Chip Stamps suggests a generally stricter
approach by the Supreme Court to the interpretation of the 1934
Act. The Court could therefore choose to enunciate a test in clarifi-
cation of Mills which comes closer to Judge Friendly's test in
Gamble-Skogmo than to the Northway standard. It can be hoped,
however, that the Supreme Court will not specifically lean toward
either view but rather restate the test formulated in Mills while
keeping in mind that a stricter approach to materiality under rule
14a-9 would have a tendency to undermine the test for materiality
under rule 10b-5 as enunciated in Affiliated Ute Citizens. The Su-
preme Court's biggest problem in enunciating any test will be, as it
always is, finding language which will facilitate interpretation by
future courts confronted with a similar issue. A test which embodies
the hypothetical "reasonable man" is theoretically an objective test,
but the use of such words as "might" and "significant" necessarily
undermine its objectivity, and give it more the appearance of a
subjective standard. The Court is asked to choose between two di-
vergent approaches, but its ability to articulate its test will tran-
scend the importance of the approach it takes.
RICHARD H. POTTER
AUTHOR'S NOTE
Subsequent to the preparation of this comment, on June 14, 1976,
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in TSC Industries,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc.' As suggested above, the Court rejected the
Seventh Circuit test of materiality and remanded the case for new
proceedings consistent with its newly formulated test of materiality.
The Court noted that in Mills, the discussion of materiality was
only preliminary to a consideration of the necessity for reliance on
a material omission, and that even if the Mills materiality language
were controlling, its "significant propensity" phrase came closer to
the mark.' Further, it narrowed the meaning of the materiality
language in Affiliated Ute sufficiently to destroy its usefulness as a
definition.3 Having thus cleared the way for an authoritative defini-
1. 96 S. Ct. 2126 (1976).
2. 96 S. Ct. at 2132.
3. Id. n.9.
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tion of materiality, the Court took a position somewhere between
the "might have" language of Northway and the "would have" (con-
ventional Restatement of Torts test) language of Gamble-Skogmo
in enunciating the following test: an omitted fact is material if there
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would con-
sider it important in deciding how to vote.'
Such a definition would seem to require a result similar to the
interpretation of the Mills language suggested above'-such sub-
stantial likelihood would cause some reasonable shareowners to
change their vote, possibly affecting the outcome.
It remains to be seen whether the substitution of "substantial
likelihood" for "significant propensity" and "would" for "might"
will make the courts' task of applying words to factual situations
any less confusing. What does seem clear is that the Supreme
Court's disposition of the Northway case, along with its decision in
Blue Chip Stamps, will stand as a significant impediment to the
free-wheeling approach taken in recent circuit court decisions giving
relief to disgruntled shareholders.
R.H.P.
4. Id. at 2133.
5. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
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